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Writing necessarily refers to writing.  The image is that of a mirror capturing only the reflections of other 
mirrors.  When i say “I see myself seeing myself,” I/i am not alluding to the illusory relation of subject to 
subject (or object) but to the play of mirrors that defers to infinity the real subject and subverts the notion 
of an original “I.”  A writing for the people, by the people, and from the people is, literally, a multipolar 
reflecting reflection that remains free from the conditions of subjectivity and objectivity and yet reveals them 
both.  I write to show myself showing people who show me my own showing.  I-You: not one, not two.  
In this unwonted spectacle made of reality and fiction, where redoubled images form and reform, neither I 
nor you come first.  No primary core of irradiation can be caught hold of, no hierarchical first, second,  
or third exists except as mere illusion.  All is empty when one is plural.   
Yet how difficult it is to keep our mirrors clean. 
 
 Trinh T. Minh-ha, Woman Native Other 
 
 
Can this being together in homelessness, this interplay of the refusal of what has been refused, this 
undercommon appositionality, be a place from which emerges neither self-consciousness nor knowledge of 
the other but an improvisation that proceeds from somewhere on the other side of an unasked question? 
[…] That spiraling Mackey speaks of suffers brokenness and crumpling, the imposition of irrationally 
rationalized angles, compartments bearing nothing but breath and battery in hunted, haunted, ungendered 
intimacy.  Is there a kind of propulsion, through compulsion, against the mastery of one’s own speed, that 
ruptures both recursion and advance?  What is the sound of this patterning?  What does such apposition 
look like?  What remains of eccentricity after the relay between loss and restoration has its say or song? 
 




1. INTRODUCTION : COMEDY AS CRITICAL DISSONANCE 
 
 
Comedy is a liberatory praxis, with a singular capacity to vitalize.   
 
Racism is a temporal construct.  
That racist temporality can be carved into relief as a timeline, as a narrative of progress, 
and also as a narrative of representation. 
 
Linear time and linear narrative are both fueled and shaped by a narrative of progress and 
a logic of representation, which is/are the same narrative and the same timeline that 
founds and funds racism.  At their core, they share a logic that is fundamentally designed 
to oppress. 
 
Comedy lays bare the constructed nature of the narrative of progress and the logic of 
representation – as well as the shoddiness of their construction. 
 
                                                          
1     “As thought breaks into speech – as the wave breaks into foam – vitality breaks into humor.”  
      Susanne Langer, The Comic Rhythm, 1953 
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Over the course of this essay, I will illuminate the political thrust of comedy, celebrating 
the vitality that comedy summons and sources in the context of our landscape, a terrain 
which threatens extinction.  I will first depict our environment, parsing out the narrative of 
representation that so pervasively shapes and constructs our perceptions of reality.  Once 
we understand that narrative and its (bankrupt) construction, I will go on to describe the 
ways in which comedy disavows the white supremacist logic and the temporality that 
emerges from and yet also fuels it.   
 
First establishing our context by articulating the narrative of progress, I will then show how 
comedy shores up the falseness of linear time and extends a subversive temporality we 
can all live and breathe in, one that responds truthfully to an honestly perceived surround.  
Next, I will show how comedy collapses false dichotomies, most significantly the 
construction of a mind/body polarity at the locus of a racist logic that absolutely requires 
the dichotomization of the material and the abstract.   
Finally, I will trace the ways in which comedy insists on specificity, alongside the ways in 
which the logic of representation demands the false manufacturing of a totalizing world 
view, as told through the eye of an omniscient narrator. 
 
That is to say: 
Comedy extends to us a nonlinear temporality, thereby suffocating the logic of 
representation that can only run on the constructed, linear, false temporality that furnishes 
and is furnished by the narrative of progress. 
Comedy collapses false dichotomies, which are inextricably woven with and perpetuating a 
narrative of representation. 
Comedy insists on specificity, thereby denouncing a narrative of representation that hinges 
on the fantasy of a totalizing theorization, a singular truth, an omniscient narrator. 
Comic moments, therefore, disavow the narrative of representation.  Because the narrative 
demands its own totalizing truth in order to be held as true – that is, because that 
narrative insists on a standard that it ontologically cannot meet, comedy proffering even 
sporadic glimpses of the leaking, tautological foundation underpinning the narrative of 
progress serves to render the premise entirely moot. 
 
 
Which is to say: 
Comedy operates in nonlinear time.   
Comedy collapses false dichotomies. 
Comedy insists on specificity. 
------------------------------ 
Therefore: Comedy offers critical vitality in the face of oppression. 
 
 
The temporality of racism is the narrative of progress.  The logic of representation fuels 
our conception of Time and Story.  Such are the stakes of divesting from normative 
modes of time and story; such are the stakes of locating and grounding into deviant and 
deviating modes of time, story, and sense-making.  When studying the narrative of 
representation, the pervasive maleficence of its il/logic, the terrain can seem quite bleak.  
We might get thirsty, begin to wonder: is there time outside this? Is there story beyond 
this? Are all the blankets infested?  Comedy lets us know and comedy drives us to faith: 
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there is time and there is story and there is truth. 
  
Insisting on subjective, perspectival specificity and collapsing false dichotomies, comedy 
extends to us nonlinear time and nonlinear story : a rhythmic possibility, a truthful and 
lively terrain, beyond the narrative of representation – beyond the beyond it. 
 
 
Often I sit over my papers and I try to find out from what angle a given conflict has to be judged.  
Usually, I look into the light, at the brightest spot I can find, as I try to enlighten my inner being. [...] 
And look what happens: as soon as I talk to my sister -- who is sitting and working behind me – about 
this matter, I realize what hours of hard thinking have not been able to make clear to me.  It isn't as if 
she was telling me in any direct sense. [...] But since I have some vague thoughts that are in some way 
connected with what I am looking for, then once I have embarked on the formulation of the thought it is 
as if the need to lead what has been begun to some conclusion transforms my hazy imaginations into 
complete clarity in such a way that my insight is completed together with my rambling sentence.  I mix in 
inarticulate noises, I draw out my sentence connectives, I use appositions where they are not strictly 
necessary and I use other rhetorical tricks that will draw out speech: in this way I gain the time to 
fabricate my idea in this workshop of reason. [...] The sequences of thoughts and expressions go 
alongside each other, and the underlying psychological realities converge. Language, under these conditions 
is not manacles, it is not like some impediment on the wheel of the spirit.  Language is a second wheel 
on the same axle! [...] If therefore a thought is expressed in a fuzzy way, then it does not at all follow 
that this thought was conceived in a confused way.  On the contrary it is quite possible that the ideas 
that are expressed in the most confusing fashion are the ones that were thought out most clearly. [...] the 
abrupt change in activity, the passage of the mind from thinking to articulation, this abrupt change 
dampened that very excitement which was necessary for keeping the thought in mind as well as for putting 
it into words. [...] For it is not we who know.  It is a certain state of us that knows. 
 
 Heinrich von Kleist, On The Gradual Formation of Thoughts in the Process of Speech, 1805 
 
 
2. BUILDING CONTEXTUAL AWARENESS : THE LOGIC OF 
REPRESENTATION   
 
In his 1991 essay Race Under Representation, David Lloyd elucidates the temporal 
infrastructure of racism – both its logic and composition as a system as well as its mode 
of reproduction and deployment.  Noting that “in the main, the experience and the analysis 
of racism or race relations have been and continue to be cast in spatial terms”2 – which 
he asserts is wholly valid, affirming that we cannot talk about racism without discussing its 
spatiality – Lloyd argues “that these spatial terms need to be supplemented by an analysis 
of the temporal axis that is equally constitutive of racist discourse”.3   
 
Articulating that temporal axis, Lloyd cites “a normative temporality of human development 
that is applied at once to the individual, to individual nations or cultures, and to the 
human race in general,” and articulates its insidious presence: “the discourse on culture 
that emerges in the “modern era” of the West is itself structured at every level by this 
normative developmental schema”.4 
 
                                                          
2     Lloyd 249. 
3     Lloyd 249. 
4     Lloyd 250. 
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Lloyd insists that an analysis of racism cast only in spatial terms is critically myopic, and 
that if we are to fully understand racism’s mechanics and the pervasive grip it extends 
throughout our ways of seeing and being, we must analyze the temporal construction of 
racism in tandem with its spatial composition.  “The racism of culture is,” Lloyd writes, 
“an ineradicable effect of its fundamental structures”.5  The more intimate and intricate our 
understanding of this intimate, intricate system, the more muscle we have with which to 
dismantle it. 
 
Lloyd calls for the expansion of our understanding of racism to include its temporality – its 
normative developmental schema – a narrative of representation which undergirds racism at 
every point of its (incessant) conception and dissemination.  Invoking the pervasive utility 
of this normative developmental schema, Lloyd distills the integral function of a narrative of 
progress in defining taste and aesthetics, in delineating citizenship and nation, in 
disseminating colonialism and in (the ever Ginger to its Fred:) justifying colonization.  
This narrative of representation comprises the scaffolding onto and into which we build our 
way of making sense, critically funding conceptions of taste, citizenship, nation, the 
(metro)polis, common sense, as well as subjectivity – both internally, as an individual’s 
selfhood; and externally, as an individual‘s ability to identify within a larger grouping.  As 
Lloyd exposes, this narrative of representation critically funds and yet is critically funded by 
hegemonic modes of sense-making. 
 
 
Everything must hold together.  In my craving for a logic of being, I cannot help but loathe the threats of 
interruptions, disseminations, and suspensions.  To begin, to develop to a climax, then, to end.  To fill, to 
join, to unify.  The order and the links create an illusion of continuity, which I highly prize for fear of 
nonsense and emptiness.6 
 
 Trinh T. Minh-ha, Woman Native Other, 1989 
 
 
3. COMEDY OPERATES OUTSIDE LINEAR TIME 
 
In her 1991 essay from Elements of Style, Suzan-Lori Parks delineates the scaffolding 
that frames and supports her dramatic writing.  Elucidating her motives and methods as a 
playwright, Parks extrapolates on repetition: 
 
we accept it in poetry and call it "incremental refrain."  For the most part, 
incremental refrain creates a weight and a rhythm.  In dramatic writing it does 
the same--yes; but again, what about all those words over and over? 
[...] First, its not just repetition but repetition with revision.  And in drama 
change, revision, is the thing.7 
 
After defining repetition, Parks explains the implications of its utility: "secondly, a text 
based on the concept of repetition and revision is one which breaks from the text which 
                                                          
5     Lloyd 250.  I argue that Comedy denaturalizes and uncoils these fundamental structures: Comedy 
has the capacity to suffocate and undermine these fundamental structures to the point of collapse. 
6     And as Barthes notes, “(The horror of spoiling is even stronger than the anxiety of losing)” (28). 
7     Parks 9. 
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we are told to write—the text which cleanly ARCS".8   
 
Further parsing the transgression extended by repetition, Parks writes: 
 
In such plays we are not moving from A --> B but rather, for example, from 
A --> A --> A --> B --> A.  Through such movement we re figure 
A.  And if we continue to call this movement FORWARD PROGRESSION, 
which I think it is, then we refigure the idea of forward progression. And if we 
insist on calling writings structured with this in mind PLAYS, which I think they 
are, then we've got a different kind of dramatic literature.9 
 
Expounding the possibility that repetition proffers, Parks enunciates the contours of her 
aspirations as a playwright: to forge "a different kind of dramatic literature," one that re-
imagines the "movement [...] of forward progression."  Later in the same essay, she 
muses: 
 
I walk around with my head full of lay-person ideas about the universe.  Here's 
one of them: "Time has a circular shape."  Could Time be tricky like the world 
once was--looking flat from our place on it--and through looking at things 
beyond the world we found it round?  Somehow I think Time could be like this 
too.  Not that I'm planning to write a science book--the goofy idea just helps 
me NOT to take established shapes for granted.  Keeps me awing it.  Attaches 
the idea of Rep & Rev to a larger shape.  Also: [...] Standard Time Line and 
Standard Plot Line are in cahoots!10 
 
Thus, it becomes clear that for Parks, "forward progression" refers to time as much as it 
does to action and event.  The thrust of Parks' dramatic structure necessarily emerges 
from the inextricable simultaneity of form and content.  Crafted through and by way of this 
entanglement, Parks' dramatic writing subverts theatrical conventions, not by rejecting but 
by re-re-purposing them, wringing into relief a dual utility for the medium’s 
constraints.  Rendering and leveraging this double-edged sword, Parks carves out 
possibility for simultaneity: lacking and full, comic and melancholic, torn and whole, original 
and derivative, exploited and exploitative. 
 
Employing the device of Rep & Rev, Parks re-devises Forward Progression.  In another 
essay entitled Possession, Parks articulates the stakes of forging such a temporality.  She 
writes: 
 
   Since history is a recorded or remembered event, theatre, for me, is 
    the perfect place to "make" history—that is, because so much of   
   African-American history has been unrecorded, dismembered, washed   
   out, one of my tasks as a playwright is to—through literature and   
   the special strange relationship between theatre and real-life11—locate   
   the ancestral burial ground, dig for bones, find bones, hear the   
   bones sing, write it down. 
                                                          
8     Parks 9. 
9     Parks 9-10. 
10    Parks 10-11. 
11    In our present moment, the “special strange relationship between theatre and real-life” has expanded: 
it has become stranger, more special, and – due to the proliferation of layers and levels of reality – it is 
more palpably relating all the time. 
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The bones tell us what was, is, will be; and because their song is a play—
something that through a production actually happens—I’m working theatre like 
an incubator to create "new" historical events.  I'm re-membering and staging 
historical events which, through their happening on stage, are ripe for inclusion 
in the canon of history.12 [...] Through each line of text I'm rewriting the Time 
Line—creating history where it is and always was but has not yet been 
divined.13 
 
Throughout her body of work, Parks' dramatic structure and movement are defined by a 
temporality that emerges from Rep & Rev.14  Parks' writing for the stage animates a dual 
function: it is as much an excavation—an act of “putting the body back together”—as it is 
a re-imagining of the past.15  Drawing from history, Parks sketches new content as well 
as form, etching possibility for a Black wholeness within our fraught and exploited 
landscape. 
 
Despite the ample distinction between the disciplines from which their respective writings 
emerge, the convergence of Parks’ and Lloyd’s theorizations is uncanny and undeniable.  
Reading them alongside one another bridges art and life, bringing the permeable 
membrane that they share, their double-sided mirror, to the fore.  Standard Time Line, 
Standard Plot Line, and Developmental Narrative of Representation are all three in 
cahoots!16 
 
Parks articulates “one of [her] tasks as a playwright,” to “locate the ancestral burial 
ground, dig for bones, find bones, hear the bones sing, write it down”.  Her articulation 
echoes with Lloyd’s depiction of possibility when he writes: 
 
   The insistence of contradiction in racial formations, their inability  
   to totalize the domain of the Subject, is politically as well as  
   historically instructive. […] For if the public sphere or culture  
                                                          
12    Here we see a mind/body collapse: the imagined, through a play, actually happens.  Thus, that 
which takes place onstage and that which takes place offstage trade in the same normative, hegemonic 
logics, and we can potentially disrupt those logics from either location, perspective, or level of reality.  
Innovations onstage have profound implications offstage; disruptions offstage will inevitably shape that which 
crosses or inhabits the stage. 
13     Parks 4-5. 
14     Barthes offers his own take on a notion of Rep & Rev: “I can “surmount,” without liquidating; what 
I have affirmed a first time, I can once again affirm, without repeating it, for then what I affirm is the 
affirmation, not its contingency: I affirm the first encounter in its difference, I desire its return, not its 
repetition.  I say to the other (old or new): Let us begin again” (24). 
15     Parks 5. 
16     To some degree, we can see that time is form and space is content.  Thus any collapse or 
explicit webbing of form and content at least interrupts and at best corrodes this (racist) way of thinking 
and knowing.  To some degree (perhaps to the same degree), Lloyd is calling for an analysis of racism 
that can attend and attest to the intricacy with which its form and its content, its conception and its 
dissemination, cross-hatch.  As Lloyd parses, the logic with which and onto which racism is constructed is 
one that insists each moment of its enunciation makes it real, and insists each moment that its reality 
yields its enunciation.  Racism relies upon and disseminates a logic of representation.  Thus to disturb that 
logic is to critically disrupt the system of racism.  Ruptures in representation are vital: critical sources of 
life.  Work that collapses form and content, work that brings into relief their cross-hatching ontology, work 
that foregrounds multiple levels of reality, work that aligns fullness with lack : these fissures breach the 
hegemony of representation, shoring up its insecurity, laying bare the false foundation from which it 
emerges. 
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   furnishes a crucial ideological, and racist, regulative site, its  
   critique is guided by what Walter Benjamin designated as the task  
   of the materialist historian – “to brush history against the grain.”  
   […] To do so is, in effect, to decipher the history of the possible  
   and to trace the contours of numerous alternatives to dominant  
   modes of social formation.17 
 
Just as Parks’ “bones tell us what was, is, will be,” just as she is “working theatre like 
an incubator to create ‘new’ historical events,” she is “brush[ing] history against the 
grain,” “decipher[ing] the history of the possible and [tracing] the contours of” divined 
possibilities “which, through their happening on stage, are ripe for inclusion in the canon 
of history”.18 
 
Linear time is ontologically racist.   
Racism is a temporal construct. 
The comic tempo exists in non-linear temporality – exists in a live, life-giving, vital, 
vitalizing, ricocheting, three-dimensional, sentient, embodied Time: a time that traces and 
holds all the people and all the people’s bones, contouring reality in real time.  (Not a 
time designed to order and exterminate a reality and its people). 
 
Comedy does not just have a rhythm: comedy is a rhythm.  Comedy is a metronome.  If 




4. COMEDY COLLAPSES FALSE DICHOTOMIES 
 
Lloyd stresses that colonization and the field of aesthetics run on the same tracks and are 
powered by the same fuel: the logic of representation.  The false temporality incurred and 
inferred by a developmental organization of the senses is imposed on reality in order to 
enact and justify the violent praxis of colonization, just as it is leveraged to cast aesthetic 
order onto our otherwise (necessarily) chaotic semiotic and somatic scape.  Both systems 
of judgment and classification habitually go around erecting poles and doctoring spectra 
between them, spectra which trace a developmental narrative of representation.  
Representation itself is a hall of trick mirrors, relying on a false logic of metaphor and 
metonymy (a false logic of synonym on the whole).  Aesthetics and colonization, as 
systems that rely on that hall of trick mirrors, inventory and categorize and subsequently 
determine and exact the fates of these categorizations, using as a point of departure the 
fiction (asserted and leveraged as fact) that these categorizations are organic.   
 
The conception of taste to which Lloyd refers tacitly presumes and marches along this 
narrative of progress, one that articulates the distinction between, say, a wine connoisseur 
and someone who enjoys a white zinfandel from the corner store, as a temporal gap – as 
a distance that has been walked within one’s own lifetime or over the course of 
generations such that one’s lineage connotes one’s inheritance and falsely (or is falsely 
                                                          
17     Lloyd 267. 
18     Parks 4-5 + Lloyd 267. 
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understood to) stands in for one’s taste. In reality, of course, the two judgments and the 
two scopes of knowledge are entirely concomitant, co-existing in the same moment, and 
the movement from one pole to the other (the polarity of which is as false as are the 
terms of the dichotomy19) may or may not take place – and whether or not it does will 
not be necessarily (nor solely) determined by the passing of time nor an accumulation of 
knowledge.  
 
We know that this is a false progression because we know plenty of people who used to 
love a zinfandel from the deli and then found themselves surrounded by more cash, 
choices and knowledge with respect to wine, and yet remain partial to the deli’s zinfandel. 
We know that if we polled everyone in the world regarding the best cup of coffee, there 
would be a bouquet of answers, each no less or more a correct answer to the subjective 
prompt, and yet coffee shop upon coffee shop pile up on recently repurposed blocks of 
Brooklyn, all of them leaning on and proliferating the idea that one can achieve through 
time, study and social mobility, a better palette for and heightened awareness of The Best 
Cup of Coffee. 
 
Wine and coffee can be helpful in grasping the (faulty) developmental narrative of 
representation, but nothing illustrates it with more precision than does comedy.  Jokes told 
of and by the body are no less or more funny than those told through a series of 
abstractions.  In comedy, the literary and the literal are absolutely leveled and constantly 
commingling.  A joke is only ever as funny as its audience says that it is, which is to 
say a joke is never a static entity, but instead an ephemeron, floating between a teller 
and a told.20  
 
Elucidating the temporal composure of racism, Lloyd extends his profound insight: false 
binaries and faulty dualisms do not just sit still, but in fact exist in and are predicated on 
a temporal relationship, along a logic of linear progression which is (always already) a 
narrative of representation.21   
 
Parsing what he means by the modern discourse on culture, Lloyd contends that it is “the 
establishment of a peculiar and historically specific social form, the public sphere22 as 
                                                          
19     Which is to say: the form of which is as false as is the content.   
20     Quite like Zeami’s flower.  In A Lover’s Discourse, Roland Barthes offers further insight on the life 
of that space between: “I divine that the true sit of originality and strength is neither the other nor myself, 
but our relation itself […] when the relation is original, then the stereotype is shaken, transcended, 
evacuated, and jealousy, for instance, has no more room in this relation without a site, without topos – 
without what in French we call, colloquially, ‘topo’ – without discourse” (35-6).  Barthes elucidates not 
only the life of the space between, but its critical potential to proliferate life: the capacious implications of 
innovating or somehow interrupting the habits of that space between. 
21  This insight is critical, particularly right now, when linear time has dissolved such as it has, thus 
enabling the undoing of these dualities in a deep and lasting way.  Our right now is defined by a 
particular and profound capacity for disruption and innovation.  What sorts of interruptions and incisions we 
make is up to us; but the energy for capacious change is thick and sure and in the air. 
22  In recent years, as a result of the multi-platform social scape that the internet produces and or 
stages, this conception of a “public sphere,” has been pushed to its capacity, further materialized, 
manifested its own bursting at its own seams, sort of hyper-realized.  Thus if the public sphere has 
shifted as it has, expanded and multiplied as it has, this indeed signals a critical fissure in the foundation 
of racism.  Its possibility is fundamentally undermined.  The public sphere has at once become more 
material and yet also more abstract, abstracted beyond the abstracted, imagined beyond the imaginary, into 
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defined in aesthetic theory, as the end of humanity that defines the logical structure of 
racist discourses”.23  Laying bare the “logical structure of racist discourse”, Lloyd 
foregrounds the shoddy, tautological foundation underpinning this system of oppression: 
“racism is structured in the first place by the cultural determination of a public sphere and 
of the subject formation that is its condition of existence”.24 
 
In sketching his “phenomenology of racism as it is embedded in the ‘disposition of the 
subject’ produced and maintained by Western culture,” Lloyd begins “with a moment from 
one of the founding texts of cultural theory, namely, Immanuel Kant’s third critique, The 
Critique of Judgement”.25  Lloyd first cites the broader work of the text, “Kant’s deduction 
of the universality of the aesthetic judgment,” which “relies on the disinterest of the subject 
of judgment” – or on what Lloyd refers to as “the ‘Subject without properties’” – before 
closely reading “Taste as a kind of sensus communis”, an essay of Kant’s extending a 
detailed account of the sordid, romantic encounter between and among identity, beauty, 
communicability, race, and what it is to be human, in a room lit by heady morality and 
fragranced by sensuous charm.26  
 
In his rigorous approach to Kant’s submission regarding “the idea of a public sense,” or 
“a critical faculty which in its reflective act takes account of [...] the collective reason of 
mankind,” Lloyd reveals the double-edged implications of a public sense, shoring up the 
interdependence and reciprocal causality of the principles that found it as well as those 
that allegedly emerge from it [emphasis my own]: 
    
In this prescription for the aesthetic judgment, the movement from matter to form 
in the representation of the object corresponds to a less immediately evident 
formalization internal to the subject, a formalization that becomes the condition 
for the existence of a public sense.  Only a subject formalized, if momentarily, 
into identity with “every one else,” that is, with the Subject in general, can 
provide the conditions for the universal accord of a common or public sense.  As 
we shall see, what is at first the merely logical temporality of the aesthetic 
judgment becomes prescriptive for the narrative of representation through which 
this actualization of common sense in the modern sphere is to be realized. 
   That process can be summarized in the following propositions: 
 
 1. the ordering of “our general state of representative activity” is such as 
to imply a narrative organization of the senses that moves from sensation 
to form; 
 2. this narrative of the senses within the individual human subject finds a 
correspondent form in the development of the human race; 
 3. this narrative can be expressed as or, alternatively, depends on a 
                                                          
a real place that is not tangible – it is digible.  The space that this new formation of the public sphere 
takes and makes, its shifty relationship to objective, material, reality, mimics the nonsensical ricochet that 
Kant reveres as gratifying.  The cybersphere serves to collapse the narrative of representation that posits 
an object to which we viscerally respond and its abstraction, which we ponder with disembodied dignity.  
23     Lloyd 254. 
24     Lloyd 254.  The terms of subject formation have shifted.  The conditions for and of subject 
formation; the means and the ends of subject formation are in a state of profound disruption : and 
disruption signals possibility.   
25     Lloyd 251. 
26     Lloyd 251. 
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movement from contiguity to identity, or from metonymy27 to metaphor.28 
 
One’s ability to identify with the group determines one’s claim to Subjectivity.  One’s 
ability to access the common sense connotes how much of a subject one is, or how 
much power one holds as a subject.  Impossibly, yet according to this logic, the more 
power one has, the more one determines that common sense.   
 
Significantly, “what is at first the merely logical […] becomes prescriptive,” which is also a 
compelling way to enunciate why an identity-based approach, though it may have varying 
degrees of merit, is always ultimately a dead-end.  Ontologically, identity is stable and 
fixed and always already recalls a stable, fixed point of origin (a moment in the past) 
which is a fiction, although leveraged as a fact.29  As a critical gear in the function of the 
logic of representation, it cites another fault line – via its temporality as well as its claim 
to stability – in the developmental narrative. 
 
In response to Kant’s “simultaneously literal and metaphoric usages of both the terms 
‘common sense’ and ‘taste,’” Lloyd offers his poetically incisive treatment of the movement 
that Kant ascribes in his quest for the “beautiful, which is to be universally 
communicable,” and his dialectical affair with identity, that “of the individual and [that] of 
the human ‘race’”: 
 
   what these concepts describe is the very movement they require  
   from the immediate particularity of sensation to the formal generality  
   of the social.  For “sense” to become “common,” its conditions  
   must be formalized as a disposition of the Subject in each of us;  
   for “taste” to emerge as a social phenomenon, the cultivation of the  
   sense must proceed from the pleasure derived from the existence of  
   the object that is characteristic of literal “taste” to the contemplative  
   relation to the object, which is the capacity of sight.  This narrative  
   of the organization of the senses toward an increasing distance from  
   the object and an increasing formalization of its representation is  
   parallel for Kant to the movement from the merely agreeable, which  
   is private and entirely singular, to the beautiful, which is to be  
   universally communicable.  In the discourse of aesthetic culture,   
   which itself emerges in the increasing abstraction of aesthetics itself  
   from the science of pain and pleasure to that of fine art, this  
   narrative organization of the senses in a crucially developmental  
   hierarchy is fundamental.30 
 
Lloyd persistently reiterates that taste and the logic of representation are ensnared in a 
tautological, mutually co-generative and co-dependent relationship with one another.  “The 
                                                          
27     Just as a form/content collapse significantly disrupts hegemonic narratives of representation, 
collapses and confusions between parts and wholes also disrupt this (racist) logic, carving space for new 
or different modes of sense-making, creating space for possibility, if not manifesting new possibilities as 
well. 
28     Lloyd 251-2. 
29     As Minh-ha affirms: “The real, nothing else than a code of representation, does not (cannot) 
coincide with the lived or the performed” (94). 
30     Lloyd 252-3.  The fact that it is a MOVEMENT, the fact that it is TEMPORAL, in its conception 
and in its reproduction, make the logic of representation and the social matrix of racism well-suited for 
dialogue with performativity and theorizations of theatricality.  In fact, they are ontologically dialectical, in 
relationship to one another by design. 
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discourse of aesthetic culture,” as Lloyd refers to it, in order to distinguish it from its 
ontological base, is a system which seeks to make sense.  It does so by crafting a 
narrative, that “of the organization of the senses toward an increasing distance from the 
object and an increasing formalization of its representation”.31  Utilizing repetition to 
underscore his point, Lloyd emphasizes that this narrative organizes the senses “in a 
crucially developmental hierarchy,” a turn of phrase which he has proven to be redundant 
in its expression of the temporality as well as the power inherent to the narrative.   
 
“The discourse of aesthetic culture,” Lloyd reminds us, “itself emerges in the increasing 
abstraction of aesthetics itself from the science of pain and pleasure to that of fine art”.32  
What is meant by the term Aesthetics, the field (or perhaps more aptly, the discipline) of 
aesthetics, is itself a representation, a formalization of our sensory field of aesthetic stimuli, 
which Lloyd succinctly calls ‘the science of pain and pleasure.’  Thus, a narrative of 
representation employs a narrative of representation in imposing a false developmental 
hierarchy onto reality.   
 
Explication of the relationship between aesthetics and the logic of representation sounds 
almost nonsensical because it is just that: nonsense.  Yet it is nonsense parading around 
as logic, explicitly claiming the supremacy of logic while issuing the supremacy of logic 
from its pores.  The tyranny of logic33 is never more apparent than when it breaks down 
in such a coiled, silly way.  The image of a knotted-up slinky comes to mind.  The 
discourse of aesthetic culture and the logic of representation are ontologically entangled, as 
inextricably co-reliant as a house of cards: any static, well-defined, or steady(ing) 
distinction drawn between them would be a false one. 
 
The Logic Has No Clothes, and Lloyd persistently parses, taking precise stock of its lack.  
Laying bare the tenacious recurrence of tautology,34 Lloyd throws into relief still more 
manifestations of Kant’s proclivity for nonsense: his slippage between the individual and the 
entire human race, a slip that Kant glosses in order to maintain his paper’s posture as a 
totalizing theory.35  (A bookstore’s shelves are all labelled, signs announcing the genres of 
the titles you’ll find just below.  Those labels don’t signal all the types of books that there 
are; they simply tell us what is for sale here today.) 
 
the developmental narrative of sensual organization is required by  
                                                          
31     Lloyd 252. 
32     Lloyd 252. 
33     A syntax I borrow from Morgan Jenness, who decries the tyranny of realism in the theatre. 
34     Barthes revels in the potential energy of the breakdown of logic: “Adorable is the futile vestige of a 
fatigue – the fatigue of language itself.  From word to word, I struggle to put “into other words” the 
ipseity of my Image, to express improperly the propriety of my desire: a journey at whose end my final 
philosophy can only be to recognize – and to practice – tautology. […] What thereby closes off the lover’s 
language is the very thing which has instituted it: fascination.  For to describe fascination can never, in the 
last analysis, exceed this utterance: “I am fascinated.”  Having attained the end of language, where it can 
merely repeat its last word like a scratched record, I intoxicate myself upon its affirmation: is not tautology 
that preposterous state in which are to be found, all values being confounded, the glorious end of the 
logical operation, the obscenity of stupidity, and the explosion of the Nietzschean yes?” (20-1). 
35     “The story never stops beginning or ending.  It appears headless and bottomless for it is built on 
differences.  Its (in)finitude subverts every notion of completeness and its frame remains a non-totalizable 
one.  The differences it brings about are differences not only in structure, in the play of structures and of 
surfaces, but also in timbre and in silence” (Minh-Ha 2). 
 11 
the developmental history of the race of which, at every stage of  
that development, it is the index. [...] the movement, as Kant puts  
it, from “the charm of sense to habitual moral interest” that taste  
makes possible is at once an affair of the individual and of the  
human “race.”  The same development that produces in each  
individual a capacity for subjectively universal judgments of taste  
produces in human societies the civilized form of the public sphere.   
Kant thus describes the movement from a primitive interest in  
“charms of sense” to “universal communicability”.36 
 
In crafting his conception of taste, Kant’s focus is defining the movement “from the 
immediate particularity of sensation to the formal generality of the social“.  In depicting a 
single movement, Kant aligns several choreographies, proclaiming them parallel: from literal 
taste to literal sight; from immediate pleasure in an object’s existence to contemplative 
pleasure about an object; from the “merely agreeable” to the “beautiful“; from the “private 
and entirely singular” to the “universally communicable“. 
 
The narrative organization of the senses is a movement, and as such, it invokes time in a 
two-fold capacity:  movement is a physicalization of time, the tangible register of 
temporality; time is abstracted by a developmental narrative.  Thus the narrative 
organization of the senses, as a movement, is a body-mind invocation and enunciation of 
(its) temporality.  Significantly, we persistently find ourselves requiring the collapse of 
mind and body in order to rigorously engage with comedy.  What’s more, the collapse of 
mind and body is certainly requisite in engaging comedy – in telling jokes, in making 
people laugh, and in laughing.  A great joke embodies the Kantian Agreeable just as it 
does the Kantian Beautiful: the experience of a great joke invokes a sensation at once 
private, entirely singular, and yet universally communicable.  As I laugh, I am rooted down 
into my body, viscerally reminded of my material self; as I laugh, I am reminded of the 
various groupings to which I belong, catalyzed into awareness of my self among others 
and the self-ness I share with others.  The impossible simultaneity rings true. 
 
Comedy lives in an interstitial space between and among the ends of Kant‘s movement – 
it inhabits the both/and of the polarities of these (false) spectra.  Comedy takes place 
and time outside the logic of representation; it de-naturalizes representation and 
suffocates37 its testimonies of truth.  It becomes proof of the shoddy construction of racism, 
colonialism, white supremacy, and all the systems built onto or in order to justify them.  
Comedy is the single thread pulling that unravels the false38 whole.  
 
 
Laughter is very powerful -- it’s not a way of escaping but a way of arriving on the scene. 
  Think about laughter and what happens to your body -- it’s almost the same thing that happens to you 
when you throw up. 
  
Suzan-Lori Parks, from Elements of Style, 1994 
                                                          
36     Lloyd 252-3. 
37     An image I borrow from Minh-Ha, who also writes: “I memorize, recognize, and name my 
source(s), not to validate my voice through the voice of an authority (for we, women, have little authority 
in the History of Literature, and wise women never draw their powers from authority), but to evoke her 
and sing” (122). 





Within The Critique of Judgement, Kant also delineates his conception of gratification.  He 
begins by classifying “all gratification [...] at bottom bodily sensation”.39  Clarifying the 
term, Kant submits, “that which gratifies (pleases in sensation) [...] appears always to 
consist in a feeling of the furtherance of the whole life of the man, and consequently, also 
of his bodily well-being, i.e. his health”.40  Articulating comedy as a source for 
gratification, Kant traces its path through the body’s organs: 
 
In the case of jokes [...] The play begins with the thoughts, which together 
occupy the body, [...] and as the understanding stops suddenly short at the 
presentment, in which it does not find what it expected, we feel the effect of 
this slackening in the body by the oscillation of the organs, which promotes the 
restoration of equilibrium and has a favorable influence upon health.41 
 
Kant’s conception of gratification is fundamentally biological: gratification is felt in the body 
as a series of physiological symptoms; regardless of its source, its course culminates in a 
thoroughly embodied experience, free of mind, logic or sense, and constituted entirely by 
sensation.  While the mind may catalyze the gratifying process, or aesthetic judgment may 
spur the ensuing reaction, Kant defines anything in a moment of gratification that is 
beyond embodiment as a steward for the body – an usher through the process, but never 
the subject of its execution: 
 
It is not the judging the harmony in tones or sallies of wit—which serves only in 
combination with their beauty as a necessary vehicle—but the furtherance of the 
vital bodily processes, the affection that moves the intestines and the diaphragm, 
in a word, the feeling of health [...] that makes up the gratification felt by us, 
so that we can thus reach the body through the soul and use the latter as the 
physician of the former.42 
 
The mind or the spirit may nourish and heighten the process, but their participation 
requires their ultimate absence.  While this is true for all forms of gratification, Kant’s 
diagnosis of a successful comic effect (a subset of gratification) casts it as particularly 
critical.   
 
Depicting ideal conditions for provoking that comic vitality, Kant animates the sensation of 
gratification, plotting its ricochet through physical and conceptual location: 
  
   the jest must contain something that is capable of deceiving for a  
   moment.  Hence, when the illusion is dissipated, the mind turns  
   back to try it once again, and thus through a rapidly alternating  
   tension and relaxation it is jerked back and put into a state of  
   oscillation.43 
 
Further parsing gratification’s physiological constitution, Kant reiterates the requisite 
                                                          
39     Kant 45. 
40     Kant 45. 
41     Kant 47. 
42     Kant 46-7. 
43     Kant 47-8. 
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evacuation of the mind: 
 
   This sudden transposition of the mind, now to one now to another  
   standpoint in order to contemplate its object, may correspond an  
   alternating tension and relaxation [...] and thus bring about a  
   movement beneficial to health; which alone, and not what precedes  
   it in the mind, is the proper cause of the gratification in a thought  
   that at bottom represents nothing.44 
 
Kant’s definition of laughter is scientific in its certainty – “Laughter is an affection arising 
from the sudden transformation of a strained expectation into nothing”45 – and remains 
unwavering throughout his reasoning.  Accounting for the “hearty pleasure” that laughter 
occasions, Kant reiterates the physical indication for such a sensory experience: 
“expectation was strained (for a time) and then was suddenly dissipated into nothing”.46  
Disentangling with precision, Kant risks redundancy47 in ensuring his clarity: 
 
   We laugh loud, and the reason is that an expectation is suddenly  
   transformed into nothing.  We must note well that it does not  
   transform itself into the positive opposite of an expected object—for  
   then there would still be something, which might even be a cause 
   of grief—but it must be transformed into nothing.48 
 
The nothingness that Kant ascribes is central to his theorization: the more easily and 
rapidly the catalyst can bounce around the body’s organs, massaging their vitality, the 
more it can generate the sensation of gratification.  Less gravity, less meaning, less sense 
– more sensation.49 
                                                          
44     Kant 48-9. 
45     Kant 47. 
46     Kant 47-8. 
47     It quickly becomes clear that the repetitive structure of Kant’s argument reflects its aim, a surprising 
collapse of form and content amidst a document so deeply invested in disseminating dualisms both wedded 
and fundamentally differentiated (ranked) by a developmental narrative that sits between their poles, as 
uncrossable as it is constructed.  This slippage is accounted for by Lloyd, who reminds us that “the 
fissures and contradictions that trouble this narrative are replicated equally at every level or in every site 
that it informs” (251).  Perhaps this is a sighting of Kant’s closeted rebellion against representation; 
perhaps this is another site wherein the fault lines of the logic of representation bare themselves. 
48     Kant 48. 
49     The ricochet that Kant illustrates is a form that maps not only laughter but across all shapes of 
gratification.  In his essay, Kant treats laughter and naïveté with equal esteem, defining the latter as “the 
breaking out of the sincerity originally natural to humanity in opposition to that art of dissimilation which has 
become second nature” (49).  The sensory gratification of apprehending such sincerity runs parallel to 
that of the comic moment, hinging on expectations set, unmet --  
 
   We look for the commonplace manner of artificial utterance devised with  
foresight to make a fair show; and behold! it is the unspoiled innocent  
   nature which we do not expect to find, and which he who displays it did  
   not think of disclosing (49).  
 
-- and in turn, dissolved to nothing: “The fair but false show which generally has so much influence upon 
our judgment, is here suddenly transformed into nothing,” and “produces a movement of the mind in two 




Kant’s gratification seems to carve an exit strategy out of the architecture he constructs 
throughout the rest of his musings on taste and aesthetic judgement – an architecture 
rigidly defined by a narrative of representation.  Kant’s thoughts on taste rely on a Mind 
and a Body – their mutual exclusivity as well as their hierarchy – forging a narrative of 
progress moving from sense to intellect, from material to abstract, from particular to 
universal, from low culture to high.  Kant’s gratification, however, insists on the interaction 
and (pleasurable) co-mingling of mind and body: a catalyst ricochets between the two – 
the more rapidly, the more gratifying; and the resulting confusion of which (in addition to 
the ultimate transformation of the catalyst into nothing) yields the sensory experience of 
gratification.  Not only does gratification depend upon the interplay of the mind and the 
body, but the resulting disorientation and perhaps momentary inability to distinguish them is 
its primary source.   
 
Kant’s theorem hinges on “the sudden transformation of a strained expectation into 
nothing;” that is, a transformation from something into nothing, the silhouette of which is 
quite similar to a transformation from material to abstract.50  And yet, in the case of 
gratification, that something is of the mind: it is an expectation, and therefore an 
abstraction.  Further, that nothing is embodied: it is felt, sensory, and according to Kant, it 
registers in the organs.  While this construction surely insists on a mind/body duality, their 
fertile relation to one another is much more palpable in Kant’s conception of gratification 
than it is in his writings on taste and judgment.  Not only is their inter-relation pivotal to 
his proposal, Kant’s gratification re-maps a hegemonic (and his own) narrative of 
representation, moving from mind to body, not along a linear path of progression, but 
instead by way of a reverberating route defined by its chaotic unpredictability.  Certainly 
not an upheaval, nor even necessarily a departure, Kant’s conception of gratification, 
embedded in a text which otherwise maintains its allegiance to the narrative structure of 
representation, does offer a notable revision51 of the form. 
     
 
History is time that won’t quit. 
 
Suzan-Lori Parks, from Elements of Style, 1994 
   
                                                          
It is clear that Kant regards such a gratification as more difficult to come by than laughter, but, as such, 
exquisite to sense upon contact.  Because its composition necessitates a lack of awareness and intention 
on the part of the naïf, he cautions his reader to avoid trying to illicit such a gratified response.  However, 
there is space within his system of classification for an artist to treat this gift of nature, which Kant offers 
directly:   “An art that is to be naïve is thus a contradiction; but the representation of naïveté in a 
fictitious personage is quite possible, and is a beautiful though rare art” (50). 
50     Kant 47. 
51     Inversion may be a more accurate term.  Again, there is an impish ambivalence to Kant’s 
inconsistency.  Certainly, a simple inversion of the developmental narrative differentiating mind from body 
while marking (only) it civilized does not change the narrative structure, nor does it necessarily re-assign 
roles.  In fact, an inversion may just signal a re-inscription, yet another iteration -- this one with more 
teeth, as it firmly, slyly cements the undergirding logic by leaning on it from a different angle, and perhaps 
with more intention.  However, there remains that wafting mischief: might Kant be extending to us a body 
endowed with power?  With a specialization that can only come from being on the right-hand side of the 
timeline?  Surely, the fact that Kant moves from mind to body along a messy trail does not cast a vote 
for the latter.  (Is the mess characterizing that trail a sign of bastardization or of reverence? Does it 
matter, since neither signals respect?) Just as surely, it is impossible to know. 
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5. COMEDY INSISTS ON SPECIFICITY 
 
In her 1953 book Feeling and Form, in a chapter entitled The Comic Rhythm, Susanne 
Langer submits that "The pure sense of life is the underlying feeling of comedy".52  In 
locating that “pure sense of life,” Langer writes that “Mankind has its rhythm of animal 
existence, too -- the strain of maintaining a vital balance amid the alien and impartial 
chances of the world, complicated and heightened by passion desires.  The pure sense of 
life springs from that basic rhythm”.53 
 
Langer systematically articulates the social landscape out of which her conception of 
comedy emerges, outlining a vision of human life/time defined by its continuity: 
 
   Living things strive to persist [...] to maintain a particular temperature, to  
   repeat a particular function, and to develop along particular lines,  
   achieving a growth that  seems to be preformed in their earliest,  
   rudimentary, protoplasmic structure. [...] This pattern, moreover, does not  
   develop sporadically in midst of mechanical systems; when or where it  
   began on the earth we do not know, but [...] there appears to be no  
   ‘spontaneous generation.’  It takes life to produce further life.  Every  
  Organism, therefore, is historically linked with other organisms. [...] Every  
  individual in this progression that dies (i.e. meets with disaster) instead of  
   dividing is an offshoot from the continuous process, an end, but not a break,  
   from the communal biography.54 
 
Illuminating the implications of this communal biography, Langer writes: 
 
   An individual is not [...] exposed only to others that visibly or tangibly  
   surround him, but is consciously bound to people who are absent, 
perhaps far away, at the moment.  Even the dead may still play into his  
life.  His awareness of events is far greater than the scope of his physical  
perceptions.55 
 
Both life and life onstage comprise a continuous wholeness, invoking that which is seen 
and unseen, present and past.  Similarly, just as life does not imply a series of individual 
divisions, life onstage is cultivated by a whole, reflecting and inflecting an intricate system 
of affect and effect.  As Langer describes, “This illusion of life, the stage-life, has a 
rhythm of feeling which is not transmitted to us by separate successive stimulations, but 
rather by our perceptions of its entire Gestalt--a whole world moving into its own future.56   
 
Here, Langer’s syntax belies the structural conceits of her Comedy.  “A whole world 
moving into its own future” demarcates and animates the role of subject (or Protagonist), 
and the terrain which the subject must traverse, in ways particular to the ends and means 
of Comedy.  Elucidating that particularity, Langer asserts that “Real comedy presents the 
                                                          
52     Langer 327. 
53     Langer 330. 
54     Langer 328-9. 
55     Langer 330. 
56     Langer 348. 
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very image of ‘livingness’ [...] it takes the form of a temporary triumph over the 
surrounding world”.57 
 
Langer’s sense of vital continuity traces that of Parks.  Just as Parks draws her task as 
a playwright to “locate the ancestral burial ground, dig for bones, find bones, hear the 
bones sing, write it down,” just as those “bones tell us what was, is, will be”,58 Langer’s 
communal biography insists that each organism “is historically linked with other organisms,” 
insists that each “individual [...] is consciously bound to people who are absent, perhaps 
far away, at the moment”.59  Langer and Parks echo one another in their articulation of 
the connective tissue threading through human life, across time, space, and generation. 
 
Langer defines the essence of comedy as the feeling of life, through her explicit reprise 
that “the human life-feeling is the essence of comedy”60; conversely, she defines the 
feeling of comedy as the essence of life: “The feeling of Comedy is a feeling of 
heightened vitality, challenged wit and will, engaged in the great game with Chance.  The 
real antagonist is the World”.61  The tautological inflection in Langer’s vision of comedy 
might be explained by its etymological roots in perpetual rebirth, which she summons in 
defining its contours: 
 
   What justifies the term "Comedy" is not that the ancient ritual procession,  
   the Comus, honoring the god of that name, was the source of this great  
   art form--[...]--but that the Comus was a fertility rite, and the god it  
   celebrated a fertility god, a symbol of perpetual rebirth, eternal live.62 
 
Langer’s theorization of comic structure hinges on the “eternal live.”  This continuity 
defines the journey of the comic protagonist as much as it shapes its orientation around 
focal points.  According to Langer, comic structure mirrors that of its content.  Like the 
vital continuity that it depicts and emerges from, “Comedy is essentially contingent, 
episodic, and ethnic; it expresses the continuous balance of sheer vitality that belongs to 
society and is exemplified briefly in each individual; tragedy is a fulfillment, and its form 
therefore is closed, final”.63 
 
Tuning her focus to jokes and laughs as they surface (or not) throughout the course of 
the comedy, Langer writes, “They are employed in the play, not merely brought in 
casually. [...] As thought breaks into speech--as the wave breaks into foam--vitality 
breaks into humour”.64  Defining humor as a symptomatic manifestation of vitality, Langer 
articulates its role in comedy as merely supportive: “Humour, then, is not the essence of 
comedy, but only one of its most useful and natural elements”.65  Thus, while it may be 
a part of comedy, humor is not a necessary element in its structural fabric.  In fact, as 
                                                          
57     Langer 348. 
58     Parks 4-5. 
59     Langer 328-330. 
60     Langer 331. 
61     Langer 348-9. 
62     Langer 331. 
63     Langer 333-4. 
64     Langer 345. 
65     Langer 346. 
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Langer illustrates, 
    
   Comedy may be serious; there is heroic drama, romantic drama, political  
   drama, all in the comic pattern, yet entirely serious; the 'history' is usually  
   exalted comedy.  It presents an incident in the undying life of a society 
    that meets good and evil fortunes on countless occasions but never  
   concludes its quest.  After the story comes more life [...] it is implicit in its  
   episodic structure.66 
 
While the act of defining comedy might seem to cast comedy and tragedy in a polarity, 
Langer demystifies their entanglement, insisting that “The difference between the two types 
of drama [...] is [...] not one of opposites [...] The matrix of the work is always either 
tragic or comic; but within its frame the two often interplay”.67  While comic moments and 
tragic beats intermingle throughout and over the course of a given drama, its “entire 
gestalt” communicates to us, and “its rhythm of feeling” lets us hear the sum of its 
shape, which will be Tragic (finite) or Comic (infinite).68   
 
The drama maintains its integrity; the drama has a shape.  Shunning all fantasies of purity 
or mutual exclusivity, Langer reminds us that of course that rhythmic gestalt is composed 
of many woven beats and threads, each of which can be tragic and comic and either/or 
and both/and.  In accounting for their interplay, Langer carefully parses their potential 
convergence and necessary divergence: “Where it reaches something like the exalted 
character of nataka, our comedy has generally been taken for tragedy, simply because of 
its dignity, or "sublimity," [...] yet [...] the Fate their personages meet is really misfortune, 
and they meet it heroically”.69  Dignity is not tragedy.  Comedy is not not dignity.  In 
fact, Comedy sees the truth and speaks the truth of the triumph of the human spirit over 
the surrounding world: its “perpetual rebirth,” its “eternal live”.70 
 
Langer’s reiterative definition persists: “Comedy is [...] an image of human vitality holding 
its own in the world amid the surprises of unplanned coincidence”.71  Illuminating the 
comic scaffolding underpinning the nataka and the work of Racine and Corneille, Langer 
writes: 
 
   Characters are godlike in their rationality [...] they undergo [...] no great  
   moral struggle or conflict of passions.  Their morality (however  
   extraordinary) is perfect, their principles clear and coherent [...] There is  
   no question of how the heroes will meet circumstances; they will meet  
   them rationally; reason, the highest virtue of the human soul, will be  
   victorious.  This reason does not grow; through inner struggles against  
   passional obstacles, from an original to full enlightenment [...] but is  
   perfect from the outset.72 
 
                                                          
66     Langer 334. 
67     Langer 334. 
68     Tragedy is within the bounds of normative linear time, while comedy is out of control.  Outside 
linear time.  Beyond a time that imagines its own developmental progress.  Perpetual rebirth.  Ongoing 
endurance.  All time?  No time?  Who’s to say?  But not linear time. 
69     Langer 336. 
70     Langer 331. 
71     Langer 331. 
72     Langer 337-8. 
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Langer articulates the dramatic thrust of comedy, elucidating that which might drive a story 
emerging from and defined by its continuity: 
    
   The incidents are so disposed as to bring out to the full the conflict  
   between an over mastering will and the forces of Fate, but the interest  
   centers in the dauntless endurance of the individual and there is little  
   attempt to envisage or suggest the universal moral problem inherent in  
   the nature of Tragedy, nor do [...] characters submit to ordinary morality;  
   each is a law unto himself by virtue of his particular kind of heroism.73 
 
The comedy bears witness to “the dauntless endurance” of its protagonist, centering on 
the persistence of a character despite shifting circumstance.  While tragedy emerges from 
a character’s change in relation to his reality, comedy is engendered by a character’s 
sameness.  Thus, “Because the comic rhythm is that of vital continuity, the protagonists 
do not change in the course of the play”.74 
 
 
Don’t be shy about looking gorgeous. 
I suggest black. 
 
Suzan-Lori Parks, from Elements of Style, 1994 
 
 
I am I and my name is Marguerite Ida and Helena Annabel, and then oh then I could yes I could I could 
begin to cry but why why could I begin to cry. 
   And I am I and I am here and how do I know how wild the wild world is how wild the wild woods 
are the wood they call the woods the poor man's overcoat but do they cover me and if they do how wild 
they are wild and wild and wild they are, how do I know how wild woods are when I have never ever 
seen a wood before. 
   I wish, (she whispered) I knew why woods are wild why animals are wild why I am I, why I can cry, 
I wish I wish I knew, I wish oh how I wish I knew.  Once I am in I will never be through the woods are 
there and I am here and am I here or am I there, oh where oh where is there and animals wild animals 
are everywhere. 
      She sits down. 
   I wish (says she conversationally) I wish if I had a wish that when I sat down it would not be here 
but there there where I could have a chair there where I would not have to look around fearfully 
everywhere there where a chair and a carpet underneath the chair would make me know that there is 
there, but here here everywhere there is nothing nothing like a carpet nothing like a chair, here it is wild 
everywhere I hear I hear everywhere that the woods are wild and I am here and here is here and here I 
am sitting sitting without a chair without a carpet, oh help me to a carpet with a chair save me from the 
woods the wild woods everywhere where everything is wild wild and I I am not there I am here oh dear I 
am not there. 
      She stands up with her hands at her sides she opens and closes her eyes and opens them again. 
[...] 
      In the distance there is daylight and near to there is none. 
 




In 1921, George Barnard Shaw wrote Tolstoy: Tragedian or Comedian?, in which he 
champions the Comedy as the dramatic form uniquely elastic enough to evolve with and 
                                                          
73     Langer 336. 
74     Langer 335. 
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reflect its time.  Celebrating the “new species, which,” he writes, “has been called tragi-
comedy when any attempt has been made to define it,” Shaw embeds in his treatment of 
Tolstoy’s work his own theorization of comedic structure.75  Lauding the “tragi-comedy as 
a much deeper and grimmer entertainment than tragedy,” Shaw insists that it is the form 
of the future: “In its tragedy and comedy alike, the modern tragi-comedy begins where the 
old tragedies and comedies left off”.76 
 
In parsing out the evolution of the tragi-comedy, Shaw’s belief in the singular capacity of 
comedy becomes evident: 
 
   Tragedy itself never developed: it was simple, sublime, and    
   overwhelming from the first: it either failed and was not tragedy at   
   all or else it got there so utterly that no need was felt for going   
   any further. [...] in the main Tragedy remained on its summit,77   
   simple, unmixed, and heroic, from Sophocles to Verdi.  Not so   
   Comedy.  When [...] horseplay and fun for fun’s sake [gave way]   
   to serious chastening of morals less and less by ridicule and more   
   and more by irony, the comic poet becoming less and less a fellow   
   of infinite jest and more and more a satirical rogue and a discloser   
   of essentially tragic ironies, the road was open to a sort of comedy   
   as much more tragic than a catastrophic tragedy as an unhappy   
   marriage, or even a happy one, is more tragic than a railway   
   accident.78 
 
After plotting the static nature of Tragedy alongside the pliable nature of Comedy through 
his Theatre’s history, Shaw asserts, “Thus Comedy has become the higher form”.79  It is 
not only what the comedy is able to express, but the fact that its form can evolve within 
its contemporary moment in order to steadily hold the perceptions and reflections of the 
artists of its time, that for Shaw makes Comedy “the higher form.”  While tragi-comedy 
can offer the stage and its spectatorship the insight and critical activation that Shaw sees 
as necessary in his socio-political moment, it is Comedy that engenders a form so 
responsive to its terrain.80  Shaw championed a spirit of experimentalism in the theatre, 
and knew that only from a theatre of Comedy could those requisite, thirsted-after 
innovations emerge. 
 
As Arnold Aronson attests in Their Exits and Their Entrances: Getting A Handle on Doors, 
“The theatre functions as a kind of collective dream81 for its society [...] It is a door into 
                                                          
75     Shaw 431. 
76     Shaw 431-2. 
77     Recall Langer on Tragedy as “closed, final” : reading Langer’s against Shaw’s tragedy fortifies and 
further funds the elasticity of comedy – its ability to move with reality, hold all of its specifics (all of its 
surface area) and reflect the continuity and interconnectedness (nonlinear temporality) that is reality. 
78     Shaw 431. 
79     Shaw 432. 
80     Spatial and temporal, material and abstracted: scape, in the broadest, most full-bodied sense of the 
word.  
81     Notably, the term ‘dream’ here extends a multiplicity of meaning, simultaneously invoking a 
reflection, a vision, a distorted vision, an ambition, an underbelly, a hidden truth, an un-tethered fantasy … 
the list proliferates.  Significantly, the abundance of meaning offered by the term ‘dream’ resists any simple 
classification as good or bad, positive or negative.   
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the soul of humankind”.82  Aronson’s conception of theatre’s cultural function, in tandem 
with Shaw’s insistence on the singularly responsive, singularly elastic capacity of comedy, 
illuminates the reciprocally reflective nature of comedy onstage.  What takes place on the 
comic stage tells us a great deal about that stage’s surround.  Because a mirror is a 
two-way street, because causal relationships are never 1:1 and always resist static 
definition, the comic stage reflects and just as surely shapes its cultural context.  To 
borrow David Lloyd’s turn of phrase, comedy is descriptive and also crucially productive: 
comedy functions as both a cultural barometer and a cultural humidifier. 
 
Comedy does not just have a rhythm: comedy is a rhythm.  Comedy is a metronome.  
Comedy is the door on our stage.  If we listen closely, we realize the time comedy keeps 
and the time comedy tolls is not linear. 
 
Racism wants there to be a whole and wants individuals to stand in for the whole.  White 
supremacy insists on erasing the specificity and the individuality of people and of 
circumstance.   
 
Grabbing on to one little bite and digesting, reflecting, responding out loud : now that’s a 
powerful act.  And one that dismantles the fantasy of a totalizing theorem, or of an 
omniscient narrator. 
 
By definition, Comedy is ethnic (Langer); Comedy is responsive (Shaw); Comedy 
compels us to arrive on the scene (Parks).  Comedy takes on the whole, big, totalizing 
force, the wet blanket logic of representation that seemingly might drown us, bears down 
on its locality, and gets real / specific.  Sees from its point of view; speaks from its 
point of view.  With one swift, sly grin, Comedy tears down the conceit of the Public 
Sense and insists on the truth of the particular. 
 
Comedy is persistently, resistantly specific in time, place, and perspective.  In the face of 
racist metonymy and its part-for-the-whole logic, comedy elaborates its point of view and 
insodoing shatters the phantasy that only the Unmarked Subject has eyes to vocalize.  
Comedy offers vitality by way of specificity, insisting on the fact of the particular and on 
the dignity of the local. 
 
 
The wind has shifted, hasn’t it?  (He makes the gestures of manipulating the sail.) 
 
Hikaru, in Yukio Mishima’s The Lady Aoi, 1957 
 
 
6. CONCLUDING : ON THE POLITICAL THRUST OF COMEDY 
 
Comedy fills out the holes while it digs out the “wholes.” 
  
Comedy takes on the whole, offers takes on the whole, pokes holes in the whole, pokes 
fun at the whole.  Pokes holes and lets us breathe.  And the whole withers as a result – 
                                                          
82     Aronson 332. 
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because the whole is a fantasy and the holes are the truth. 
 
Comedy is a liberatory praxis, offering vitality in the face of oppression.  Comedy 
interrupts the persistent naturalization of the narrative of progress, defying its totalizing 
tyranny and denouncing its underlying logic of representation.  Deflating its delusions of 
developmental grandeur, rendering it impotent.  Comedy disrupts linear time and dismantles 
false dichotomies.  Comedy renounces the Unmarked Subject and insists on specificity.  
Comedy reimagines progress; comedy reckons with the co-insiding inextricability of mind 
and body.  Comedy grounds into its peripheral vision, offers tiny insights when it can.  
Comedy honors the unwavering diligence of the human spirit.  Comedy celebrates the 
mere and sheer work ethic that is survival, and rewards it with that reason for living, that 
essence of life, that inalienable human right : Pleasure.  Comedy is a liberatory praxis. 
 
Now, of course, not all comedy: some want to simply use the form in service of their 
ego, or to perpetuate the norms that have led the mic or the pen into their hands to 
begin with.  But the liberatory praxis is woven so deeply into the fibrous core of its 
spiritual flesh that even when one doesn’t mean to wield the real power of the comic 
incision, the effect is the same.  That is what we see from Kant: even an architect of the 
narrative of representation cannot help but disassemble the racist and dissembling logic 
undergirding his apparatus of analysis when treating comedy. 
 
As we embark on this decidedly shifted terrain, we will need some extent of preparation.  
As a threshold, this moment requires bravery: to lean into the seedlings, though the 
grasses are so seemingly well-developed; to lean into disorder and let go of outmoded 
modes of being and of seeing.  This moment requires trust and gut and trust in gut.  
Jack Halberstam’s reading of Moten and Harney might be galvanizing to this end: 
 
The path to the wild beyond is paved with refusal. […] Moten and Harney also 
study what it would mean to refuse what they term the ‘call to order.’  And 
what would it mean, furthermore, to refuse to call others to order, to refuse 
interpellation and the reinstantiation of the law.  When we refuse, Moten and 
Harney suggest, we create dissonance and more importantly, we allow 
dissonance83 to continue […] when we refuse the call to order […] we refuse 
order as the distinction between noise and music, chatter and knowledge, pain 
and truth.84 
 
Just as subjectivity maintains an internal awareness and an external interpellation – an 
acknowledgement of self and an acknowledgement as self – the bravery we require now is 
one that harbors a thrust both internal and external.  Expanded awareness requires the 
lung capacity to take it all in; truthful sight takes courage. 
 
And when we are called to this other place, the wild beyond, “beyond the 
beyond” in Moten and Harney’s apt terminology, we have to give ourselves over 
to a certain kind of craziness.  Moten reminds us that even as Fanon took an 
anti-colonial stance, he knew that it “looks crazy” but, Fanon, as a psychiatrist, 
also knew not to accept this organic division between the rational and the crazy 
and he knew that it would be crazy for him not to take that stance in a world 
                                                          
83     Comedy as dissonance: and dissonance as what we need and need more of and always and on 
and on 
84     Halberstam 8-9. 
 22 
that had assigned to him the role of the unreal, the primitive and the wild.  
Fanon, according to Moten, wants not the end of colonialism but the end of the 
standpoint from which colonialism makes sense.  In order to bring colonialism to 
an end then, one does not speak truth to power, one has to inhabit the crazy, 
nonsensical, ranting language of the other, the other who has been rendered a 
nonentity by colonialism.85 
          Jack Halberstam, The Wild Beyond: With and For the Undercommons 
 
For a hundred years, (literary) madness has been thought to consist in  
Rimbaud’s “Je est un autre”: madness is an experience of depersonalization.   
For me as an amorous subject, it is quite the contrary: it is  
becoming a subject, being unable to keep myself from doing so, which  
drives me mad.  I am not someone else: that is what I realize with horror.86 
Roland Barthes, A Lover’s Discourse: Fragments 
    
My story, no doubt, is me, but it is also, no doubt, older than me.  Younger 
than me, older than the humanized.  Unmeasurable, uncontainable, so immense 
that it exceeds all attempts at humanizing.  But humanizing we do, and  
also overdo, for the vision of a story that has no end – no end, no middle,  
no beginning; no start, no stop, no progression; neither backward nor forward,  
only a stream that flows into another stream, an open sea – is the vision  
of a madwoman.87                      Trinh T. Minh-ha, Woman Native Other 
 
Comedy is a “nonsensical, ranting language of the other” ; comedy offers us a way to 
“speak truth to power” by being truth in the face of power.  Comedy offers us the 
choreography for an “anti-colonial stance,” gives us the steps and the shoes in order that 
we might look properly crazy.  As a wrighter, as a reader, as a watcher, as a performer: 
comedy extends a place and time (a place in time?) beyond “the standpoint from which 
colonialism makes sense.”  The nonsense rings true; the nonentity speaks.  The void fills, 
the nothing proves ever fertile. 
 
While Comedy does not offer us refuge from madness, it does allow us to revel in our 
madness.  Comedy is our trap door.  No way out but through.  And yet, comedy extends 
to us a way to go out and through, through the beyond, to the beyond the beyond.  
 
Comedy gives us a place to inhabit and a way to inhabit it.  A way to feel steadied by 
the constant unsteadiness.  Its interstitiality, its instability, its irreverence, and its utter 
disloyalty to everything and everyone: its anoriginary place, its anoriginary time, its 
anoriginary drive, its anoriginary means, its anoriginary end.  An end which is not an end 
at all, but an ongoing and going, because if its one thing we know, “time […] won’t 
quit”. 
 
In his foreword to A Lover’s Discourse, Wayne Koestenbaum writes of Barthes’ love affair 
with nuance: “Nuance is distinct from beauty, love, or virtue.  Nuance is not a direct 
object; it is an aura that the object surreptitiously allows.”  The indirectness of 
Koestenbaum’s nuance is apt when attempting to articulate comedy.  Comedy is 
ontologically without ontology.  Comedy is unstable, non-static, never here, always there.  
Comedy is a mode.  A way.  Like nuance, it is a perspiration, never a thing in itself.  
                                                          
85     Halberstam 8. 
86     Barthes 121. 
87     Minh-ha 123. 
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Always issuing from its source with pleasure, giving pleasure, assuring us of the 
abundance of pleasure there is to be felt.  Like pleasure, comedy cannot be had – only 
felt, as it is ever passing through.  It points at structure’s contours, it points out 
structure’s fallibility, it ridicules structure’s pride. 
 
Minh-ha tells us: “Between the twin chasms of navel-gazing and navel-erasing, the 
ground is narrow and slippery”.88  Comedy, lithe and sure-footed, is clever enough to 
traverse that ground.  Not to move from A to B, but simply to move: to move on, to 
move out, to move from, to move in – to breathe movement where standing water 





































In life, we usually don’t know when an event is occurring; we think it is starting when it is already ending; and we 
don’t see its in/significance.  The present, which saturates the total field of our environment, is often invisible to us.  
The structural activity that does not carry on the cleavage between form and content but emphasizes the interrelation 
of the material and the intelligible is an activity in which structure should remain an unending question: one that 
speaks him/her as s/he speaks it, brings it to intelligibility.89   
                                                          
88     Minh-ha 28. 





That is one account on one account. 
from Gertrude Stein’s Patriarchal Poetry, 1927 
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